Did USS Spruance and USS Paul F. Foster Swap Hulls?

Debunking a Persistent Shipyard Myth

From time to time, a story circulates among shipmates and naval enthusiasts claiming that USS Spruance (DD-963) and USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964) somehow “swapped hulls” during construction after an accident at the shipyard.

It’s a great sea story—but the facts, timelines, official Navy documentation, and firsthand accounts all point to the same conclusion:

👉 This did not happen.

⚓ The Scuttlebutt

“You may have heard this one on the mess decks or in the engine room…” “Maybe even a question on your ESWS board….”

The story usually goes like this:

” Hey did you know that when they were building these ships, DD- 963 fell off the blocks in dry dock and broke her keel and the Navy swapped keels/hulls with our ship so Spruance would still come out of the shipyard first” or ” Hey buddy, did you know our keel says 963 because after an accident at the shipyard the Navy swapped keels, take this bail of rags and start cleaning the bilge until you find it”

So did the Navy swap the hulls of Spruance and Foster, and what we know as DD-964 was originally meant to be DD-963?

and there’s more….the Hurricane story…

hey man did you hear that a hurricane hit the shipyard and knocked 963 off her keel blocks and broke her keel, its true man, they swapped keels between 963 and 964 to fix her first so she could get commissioned first, its a fact man”

Like many good sea stories, it sounds believable—but it doesn’t hold up when you look at the facts.

The Origin of the Story

The myth likely traces back to a real event—the Litton launching platform accident at Ingalls Shipbuilding.

📅 March 13, 1975

This is a well documented event, so we have a solid date for the accident and the rumored hull swap.

Our research finds no other pre-commissioning accidents involving the future USS Spruance, any serious accident involving a brand new, 1st in class ship would have been well documented.

This was a serious industrial accident involving the large floating platform used to support ship construction and launching operations.

Because of the scale of the incident, it’s understandable how speculation—and eventually sea stories—began.

The Timeline Tells the Real Story

A simple look at the construction timeline makes the idea of a hull swap impossible:

USS Spruance (DD-963) — Launched November 10, 1973
USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964) — Launched February 22, 1974
Launching platform accident — March 13, 1975

Six U.S. Navy Spruance-class destroyers fitting out at Litton-Ingalls Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Mississippi in May 1975. From left: USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964); USS Spruance (DD-963); USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968); USS Elliot (DD-967); USS Hewitt (DD-966) and USS Kinkaid (DD-965).

By the time of the accident:

Both ships had been afloat for over a year
Both hulls were fully constructed and complete
Outfitting and systems installation were already well underway

These were not incomplete hulls—they were active ships in advanced stages of construction and sea trials, The future USS Spruance had already been to sea operated by Ingalls ship building.

Commissioning Timeline Confirms It

It is true that USS Spruance (DD-963) experienced delays due to damage associated with the shipyard accident and required repairs before entering service.

However:

USS Spruance (DD-963) — Commissioned September 20, 1975
USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964) — Commissioned February 21, 1976

👉 Spruance was still commissioned first.

If a hull swap had occurred,The Navy would have documented the event with a report, any Navy accident reports would almost certainly reflect that a hull swap was performed and the how and why—but no such reports have been found!.

What the Official Navy Report Shows

The official U.S. Navy NAVSEA salvage report on the 1975 accident provides detailed documentation of the incident and recovery efforts.

March 13th, 1975, The newly built destroyer USS Spruance (DD-963) lies askew in the broken Litton Launch Platform. The break in the platform appears about halfway along the wing wall. Image scanned from Mud, Muscle, and Miracles by Captain Charles A. Bartholomew, USN and Commander William I. Milwee, Jr., USN (Ret.).

The report describes:

Damage to the launching platform structure
Complex salvage and refloating operations
Engineering assessments and repair actions

Notably, the report makes no reference whatsoever to:

Ship hull swaps
Reassignment of hull numbers
Reconstruction of completed ships
No mention of any other ships at all.

👉 For an event of this magnitude, a hull swap would have required extensive documentation and would unquestionably appear in an official Navy report.

Its complete absence is significant.

Instead, the report clearly shows the focus was on:

👉 Repairing shipyard infrastructure—not altering ships already built and afloat.

Firsthand Accounts from Plank Owners

In addition to the documented timeline and official Navy reports, the USS Paul F. Foster Association Historian has interviewed plank owners from both USS Spruance (DD-963) and USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964).

These sailors were either directly involved in, or present during, the construction and early service periods of both ships.

” I was on precom crew, I can tell you that there were many long faces among the crew, … not the least of which was PCO, CDR Ray Harbrecht, but I cannot recall ever hearing about any hull swap, actual or fake, during precom, that “legend” may have sprung up some time after commissioning.”

“I was precom snipe on Foster, fake story, 963 was repaired and commissioned late, but still commissioned, we did not swap hulls with 963”

“As a Spruance plank owner I can attest, there is absolutely no truth to this story”

“I was on Spruance during post commissioning shakedown exercises, weapons testing, shock trials and ASW testing. There were no negative effects of that incident in the floating drydock other than the delivery time line”

Their accounts are consistent:

None reported any knowledge of a hull swap
None witnessed any activity suggesting such an event
All confirmed that such a swap would have been impossible given the stage of construction and complexity of the ships

👉 Their firsthand experience reinforces what the historical record already shows.

Why a Hull Swap Was Not Feasible

Beyond documentation and testimony, basic shipbuilding reality makes the idea impossible.

By 1975:

Propulsion systems were already installed and aligned
Electrical, piping, and structural systems were fully integrated
Each ship had unique build records and certifications
Both vessels were in advanced outfitting stages

Swapping hulls at that point would have been far more complex than just repairing the damage.

What Actually Happened

The 1975 accident was serious, but it was handled through:

Standard Navy salvage operations
Engineering and structural repair efforts
Recovery and restoration of the launching platform

Ship construction continued, and the Spruance-class program stayed on track.

Separating Myth from History

Sea stories are part of Navy culture—they get passed down, evolve, and sometimes take on a life of their own.

But in this case, we have:

Verified construction timelines
Established commissioning records
Engineering reality
An official NAVSEA salvage report
And firsthand testimony from plank owners

Together, they tell a clear and consistent story:

👉 USS Spruance (DD-963) and USS Paul F. Foster (DD-964) did not—and could not—have swapped hulls.

📄 Primary Source

NAVSEA Salvage Report – Litton Launching Platform Accident (1975)
https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Portals/103/Documents/SUPSALV/SalvageReports/Litton%20Launching%20Platform%201975.pdf

Secondary source:

Electronic Greyhounds, A comprehensive study of the revolutionary Spruance-class (DD 963) destroyers, a complete study on the design and construction of the Spruance-class ships, no mention of anything related to swapping hulls.

But what about that Hurricane story…………

Relevant Hurricane information.

Yes, Hurricanes have hit Ingalls Ship building.

Camille, a Category 5 hurricane, made landfall in Waveland on August 17, 1969, as the second most intense storm to hit the United States in the twentieth century. At landfall, the 24-foot storm surge flattened everything east of the eyewall along Mississippi’s coast to the Alabama-Florida border. Camille became the second costliest hurricane of the decade ($1.421 billion). The physical destruction of housing and infrastructure was shocking; not only did people lose their homes but their businesses and livelihoods.

https://www.dh-mdah.org/hurricanes-camille-katrina-history

Hurricane Frederic hit Ingalls Ship building on September 12, 1979, a category 4 Hurricane, 127 MPH winds were recorded at Ingalls that day, another well documented event that did cause damage to several ships under construction at Ingalls at the time, but this was well past the time that DD-963 and DD-964 had been commissioned and left Ingalls for new home ports so it did not affect either ship.

The damage cost from Frederic was $2.3 billion. Five deaths were directly attributable to the storm. A storm surge of 12-15 feet on the Gulf beaches and 8-10 feet in northern Mobile Bay destroyed numerous coastal buildings. Storm surge damage was documented for 80 miles along the coast.

Even with several ships damaged, some also possibly damaging hulls, no hull swaps were recorded, swapping keels or hulls would be well documented, regardless of the cause.

“another urban legend”

https://www.weather.gov/mob/frederic

No records could be found for 1974 through 1975, the years of DD-963 and DD-964 construction so the hurricane damage story is debunked.

Final Thought

While the available evidence clearly shows that no hull swap occurred, we remain open to new information. If anyone can provide credible, verifiable documentation supporting this claim, the USS Paul F. Foster Association would welcome the opportunity to review it. Please contact us at usspaulffoster@gmail.com.

Sometimes the truth is simpler than the story—but no less impressive:

⚓ The Navy and shipbuilders overcame a major industrial accident and kept one of the most important destroyer programs in history moving forward.